In this paper, we present a construction of (n, k, d, m) secure regenerating codes for distributed storage systems against eavesdroppers that can observe either data stored in at most m storage nodes or downloaded data for repairing at most m failed nodes in a network where
Introduction
Distributed storage systems provide reliable access to data by storing the data redundantly in a collection of individually unreliable storage nodes in a network such that the data can be reconstructed from active nodes even if a small set of nodes fails. For instance, such a reliable distributed storage system can be constructed by using maximum distance separable (MDS) codes such as Reed-Solomon (RS) codes. This is optimal in the tradeoff between redundancy and reliability. With an (n, k) RS code, a data file is encoded to n shares in such a way that the data file can be reconstructed from any k shares, and the n shares are stored across n storage nodes in the network. On the other hand, it is desirable to regenerate (i.e., repair) a failed node in order to maintain such a reliable distributed storage system. Dimakis et al. [1] proposed the concept of a regenerating code that has not only the property of reconstructing the data file but also that of repairing a failed node (i.e., regenerating the data as was stored in the failed node). Under the concept of regenerating codes, a data-collector is permitted to connect to any k active nodes to reconstruct the data file, and a failed node is permitted to connect to any d active nodes to repair itself. The authors showed † † The author is with the Graduate School of Engineering, Kobe University, Kobe-shi, 657-8501 Japan.
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a) E-mail: kurihara@uec.ac.jp b) E-mail: kuwakado@kobe-u.ac.jp DOI: 10.1587/transfun.E96. A.635 that regenerating codes reduce the repair-bandwidth when d ≥ k. Further, they showed that there exists a fundamental tradeoff between the storage capacity of each node and the repair-bandwidth. In Sect. 2, the definition of regenerating codes will be described in detail. In the research results for regenerating codes by many researchers, Rashmi et al. [3] presented the general construction of exact-regenerating codes such as (a) minimum-bandwidth-regenerating (MBR) codes for all values of (n, k, d) and (b) minimum-storageregenerating (MSR) codes for all values of (n, k, d ≥ 2k − 1). Regenerating codes may be similar to secret sharing schemes. The secret sharing scheme produces shares in such a way that a share does not give any information about the data. However, in general, the secret sharing scheme does not have the property of regenerating the share as was stored in a failed node. On the other hand, in the concept of a regenerating code proposed by Dimakis et al. [1] , the regenerating code does not have the property of the security.
Combining a regenerating code with a secret sharing scheme has been proposed in [2] , [4] - [7] , [9] . Pawar et al. [2] proposed the secrecy capacity for secure distributed storage systems against passive eavesdroppers and secure regenerating codes based on MBR codes, where the codes are confined to the case n = d + 1. In [4] , [5] , [7] , [9] , secure regenerating codes based on MSR codes were proposed. In this paper, we propose a construction of (n, k, d, m) secure regenerating codes based on (n, k, d) MBR codes for any values of (n, k, d). The proposed code is an extended version of secure regenerating codes given in [6] . Previous secure regenerating codes [6] are confined to the case n = d + 1. We show that by using the proposed secure regenerating codes an eavesdropper can not obtain information about the data not only from shares stored in storage nodes but also from downloaded data for repair. The proposed secure regenerating code includes all values of parameters of secure regenerating codes given in [2, Sect. V] and [6] .
Shah et al. [9] have recently presented the secure regenerating code based on an MBR code [3] . In a construction of a secure regenerating code, their code and our code are based on the same MBR code. However, their code is different from our code. The difference between their code and our code will be described in Sect. 4 
in detail.
This paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2, we describe the storage system and the regenerating codes. And then, we define the secrecy capacity for the system and show its upper bound. In Sect. 3, we describe (n, k, d) MBR codes proposed by Rashmi et al. [3] . In Sect. 4 , we propose a conCopyright c 2013 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers struction of (n, k, d, m) secure regenerating code based on the (n, k, d) MBR code. In Sect. 5, we evaluate the security of the proposed (n, k, d, m) secure regenerating code and present our results as main theorems. In the result, we show that the proposed secure regenerating codes have the security of a ramp secret sharing scheme, and achieve the upper bound of the secrecy capacity. In Sect. 6, we prove the main theorem. Finally, a conclusion is given in Sect. 7.
Regenerating Codes and Secrecy
In this section we describe regenerating codes associated with parameters (n, k, d, α, β, B) and secret capacity for secure regenerating codes.
Assume that there are n storage nodes such as node 1, node 2, . . . , node n, in a network.
(n, k, d, α, β, B) Regenerating Codes
In a distributed storage system, a data file (a message) is encoded to n shares so that the data file is reconstructed from any subset of k shares, and n shares are stored across n storage nodes in the network. Let B be the size of the data file and let α be that of a share per node where the data size is measured in terms of symbols over a finite field F q with q elements. The share size α is equal to the storage capacity of a node. In this system, an end-user, which is called a data-collector, is permitted to connect to any k active storage nodes and download a share from each node to reconstruct the data file. This process is termed as the reconstruction property.
When a storage node fails, the failed node loses the share of itself. Under the concept of regenerating codes [1] , the failed node is permitted to connect to any d active nodes, where d ≥ k, and download data for repair purposes from each node in order to regenerate a share. In this paper, we consider exact-regeneration described in detail in [3, Sect. I-D] as a regeneration. The exact-regeneration means that the fail node regenerates exactly the same share as was stored in itself prior to failure. The d active nodes aiding in the repair are termed as helper-nodes. The downloaded data from each helper-node is called a piece for the failed node, and let β be the size of a piece. A vector consisting of d pieces downloaded from d helper-nodes is called a piecevector for the failed node, and the size dβ of a piece-vector is called a repair-bandwidth. As a result, the failed node can regenerate the same share of itself from the piece-vector. This process is termed as the regeneration property.
From the above description about regenerating codes, a regenerating code is characterized by the parameters (n, k, d, α, β, B) where k ≤ d ≤ n − 1, and such a code is written as an (n, k, d, α, β, B) regenerating code. It is desirable to minimize both of α and β for fixed k and d. It is not, however, possible to minimize both of α and β simultaneously since there is a tradeoff between choices of the parameters α and β [1] . The regenerating code with parameters (α, β) obtained by first minimizing α and then minimizing β is called a minimum storage regenerating (MSR) code. The parameters of an MSR code satisfy the following equations:
Reversing the order, the regenerating code with parameters (α, β) obtained by first minimizing β and then minimizing α is called a minimum bandwidth regenerating (MBR) code. The parameters of an MBR code satisfy the following equations:
For fixed d, an MBR code minimizes the repair-bandwidth dβ to repair a failed node.
Secrecy
Let S be a random variable with the uniform distribution over
q where L S ≤ B. Let H(S ) denote the entropy of the random variable S . The base of the logarithm of the entropy is q, and then the entropy H(S ) of S is equal to L S . A secret S is encoded to n shares c 1 , . . . , c n ∈ F α q so that the secret S can be reconstructed from any subset of k shares c i 1 , . . . , c i k . For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a share c i is stored in node i in the network. Let C i be a random variable representing a share c i . The reconstruction property then can be written as follows: for k random vari-
Assume that node f fails where f ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The failed node f connects any d helper-nodes h 1 , . . . , h d of the remaining n − 1 nodes in the network to regenerate the share c f of itself. Each helper-node h p , p ∈ {1, . . . , d}, computes a piece d f,h p ∈ F β q for the failed node from the share c h p of itself, and send it to the failed node. As a result, the failed node obtains a piece 
The parameter m will be used in a construction of an (n, k, d, m) secure regenerating code in Sect. 
We notice that if l ≥ m, then from the regenerating property by Eq. (4),
Thus we have
In this paper, from the above definitions of the two secrecy conditions, we assume that an eavesdropper can observe either at most l piece-vectors or at most m shares in the network. We propose the following definition, which refines that of the secrecy capacity given by Pawar et al. [2, Sect. V-A], of the secrecy capacity. Given a repairable and secure distributed storage system with a collection of the parameters (n, k, d, α, β) concerned with the reconstruction and the regeneration and the parameters (l, m) concerned with the secrecy, its secrecy capacity, denoted by C S = C S (n, k, d, α, β; l, m), is defined to be the maximum amount of data that can be stored in this system such that the reconstruction property and the two secrecy conditions are simultaneously satisfied for all possible data-collectors and eavesdroppers, that is,
The above definition of the secrecy capacity is similar to that of the secrecy capacity given by Pawar et (6) . On the other hand, the secrecy capacity of Eq. (10) is subject to the three conditions of Eqs. (3), (5) and (6) . Theorem 1 (Upper Bound): For a repairable and secure distributed storage system with a collection of parameters (n, k, d, α, β) and (l, m), the secrecy capacity is upper bounded as
Proof: See Appendix A.
For an MBR code, the repair-bandwidth dβ is equal to the storage size α, that is, dβ = α. Thus, if a function which determines C f from D f for repair is a bijection, then the piece-vector D f is also determined from the share C f , that is,
, and the converse is also true because of the regeneration property. Hence, for an MBR code, we can assume that l = m without loss of generality for the parameters m and l in Eqs. (5) and (6) (7)].
For the MBR code [3] used in this paper as an underlying code, the function which uniquely determines C f from D f for repair is bijective. In this paper, hence, we can assume that l = m without loss of generality for the parameters m and l in Eqs. (5) and (6), respectively. When l = m, the upper bound of Eq. (11) is simplified to
because of dβ = α.
Remark 2:
For an MSR code, in general, the repairbandwidth dβ is greater than the storage size α when k ≥ 2, that is, dβ > α. In such a situation, the secrecy capacity of Eq. (10) is useful to estimate the secrecy ability of secure MSR codes. The pair of the secrecy capacity of Eq. (10) and its upper bound of Eq. (11) are useful to estimate the secrecy ability of secure MSR codes [10] . However, secure MSR codes are outside of this paper, that is, this paper only discusses secure MBR codes.
Rashmi-Shah-Kumar (n, k, d) MBR Codes
Rashmi, Shah and Kumar [3] proposed the first constructions of general and optimal exact-regenerating codes such as (a) (n, k, d) MBR codes for all values of (n, k, d), and (b) (n, k, d) MSR codes for all values of (n, k, d) where
In this section, an (n, k, d) MBR code over F q is introduced because an (n, k, d, m) secure regenerating code based on the (n, k, d) MBR code will be proposed in the next section.
Message Matrix
moreover, we assume that n < q and the data file is composed of B message symbols in F q . Note that the parameters α and B are uniquely determined from the parameters d and k, and the parameter β is a fixed value as β = 1. Let M 1 be a k × k symmetric matrix constructed so that the k(k + 1)/2 components in the upper-triangular half of the matrix are filled up by k(k + 1)/2 distinct message symbols drawn from the set of the B message symbols of the data file.
where M t 2 is the transpose of the matrix M 2 . From the definition of the message matrix M with components u i, j , note that u i, j = u j,i for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , d}, and u i, j = 0 for all i, j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , d}.
Encoding, Share and Reconstruction
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, assign a unique and public symbol x i in F q to node i in such a way that the following two conditions are satisfied.
Condition for x i :
For the message matrix M, the share c i stored in node i is then defined as
where
q is a coding vector associated with node i and all operations are done over F q . For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the coding vector φ i associated with node i is also assigned uniquely and publicly. Note that the size of a share is d from Eq. (13) and Eq. (16). Thus, the message matrix M with B distinct message symbols is encoded to n shares c 1 , . . . , c n .
Note that all the B message symbols can be reconstructed from any k shares by using the reconstruction method proposed by Rashmi et al. [3, Theorem 3] .
Regeneration, Piece and Piece-Vector
In this section, we describe the regeneration method proposed by Rashmi et al. [3, Theorem 2] . Suppose that a node f fails and helper-nodes h 1 , . . . , h d are active. For each index p ∈ {1, . . . , d}, the helper-node h p computes a piece d f,h p for the failed node from the share c h p of itself and the coding vector φ f of the failed node as follows:
and sends it to the failed node.
As a result, the failed node obtains the piece-vector d f consisting of d pieces as follows:
Note that the sizes of a piece and a piece-vector are one and d, respectively, from Eqs. (13), (17) 
This completes the proof of the lemma.
From Lemma 3, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 4:
For any m such that m ≤ n and any 
. This completes the proof of the lemma.
(n, k, d, m) Secure Regenerating Codes
In this section, we propose an (n, k, d, m) secure regenerating code based on the (n, k, d) MBR code. The new parameter m (0 ≤ m ≤ k) is a secrecy parameter. The (n, k, d, m) secure regenerating code satisfies Eq. (2) because it can be considered as the (n, k, d) MBR code. Hence, we can assume that l = m in Eqs. (5) and (6) without loss of generality. Furthermore, the (n, k, d, m) secure regenerating code satisfies Eqs. (5) and (6) where l = m, that is, the parameter m means the perfect secrecy condition such that no information about secret is obtained from either at most m shares or at most m piece-vectors.
Construction
We define two kinds of vectors r j , 1 ≤ j ≤ d, and s j , m + 1 ≤ j ≤ d, which are subvectors of the j-th column vector of the upper-triangular matrix of the message matrix M with components u i, j in Eq. (15), characterized by the parameter m.
First, let
and let
where the above vectors are subvectors of the j-th column vector of the upper-triangular matrix of M 1 . Let
where the above vectors are subvectors of the ( j − k)-th column vector of M 2 . Next, let R 1 be the vector consisting of the k vectors r j , 1 ≤ j ≤ k, as follows:
and let R 2 be the vector consisting of the d − k vectors r j , k + 1 ≤ j ≤ d, as follows:
The length L R 1 of the vector R 1 and that L R 2 of the vector R 2 are respectively given as
Let R be the vector consisting of R 1 and R 2 as follows:
and let S be the vector consisting the d−m vectors s j , m+1 ≤ j ≤ d, as follows:
The length L R of the vector R and that L S of the vector S are respectively given as
Finally, we propose a construction of an (n, k, d, m) secure regenerating code based on an (n, k, d) MBR code by substituting secret and random symbols for the components of the message matrix M as follows: the vector S consists of L S secret symbols that are chosen from a finite field F q uniformly and independently, and the vector R consists of L R random symbols that are independent random elements uniformly distributed over F q . Then let S be called a secret, and let R be called a random vector. We assume that L R random symbols are independent of L S secret symbols. The message matrix M with B distinct entries is then filled up with all B symbols of S and R. The (n, k, d, m) secure regenerating code is then defined by the above setting the secret S and the random vector R for the message matrix M. Thus, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the share c i stored in node i for the secret S is derived from Eq. (16). 
where the vectors r j and s j are given as follows: [3] . For an MBR code, the secrecy model of their code is identical to that of our code. In a construction a of secure regenerating code, their code and our code use the same MBR code [3] as an underlying code. When = m and = 0, their code with parameters [n, k, d] and our (n, k, d, m) secure regenerating code have the same secrecy ability. However, their code is different from our code since the massage matrix of their code is different from that of our code. We denote the same points and the different points between their code and our code in the case of the same secrecy ability below. 
Reconstruction and Regeneration
We consider a reconstruction and a regeneration for an After that, the data-collector can obtain the secret S from the reconstructed message matrix M. Consequently, the (n, k, d, m) secure regenerating code satisfies Eq. (3). Similarly, a failed node can repair the share from a piece-vector consisting of d pieces from any d helper-nodes by using the regenerating method described in Sect. 3.3. Consequently, the (n, k, d, m) secure regenerating code satisfies Eq. (4).
Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the security of an (n, k, d, m) secure regenerating code proposed in Sect. 4. We introduce a parameter t, 0 ≤ t ≤ n, to evaluate the proposed codes.
Considering the (n, k, d, m) secure regenerating code with a secret S , the secret S is encoded to n shares c 1 , . . . , c n by using Eq. (16).
First, we consider the security of the (n, k, d, m) secure regenerating code for any t shares, that is, we evaluate the conditional entropy H(S |C i 1 , . . . , C i t ) of a random variable S representing a secret S given t random variables C i 1 , . . . , C i t representing any t shares c i 1 , . . . , c i t . For simplifying the notation of the index, let (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i t ) = (1, 2, . . . , t), without loss of generality. We show the following first main theorem.
Theorem 7:
For t random variables C 1 , . . . , C t representing any t shares c 1 , . . . , c t ,
where the function g(t) of an integer variable t is defined by
Notice that H(S ) = L S from the definition of the secret S . In particular, when t = m, Eq. The function g(t) of a variable t is a convex and monotonically decreasing function in the range m ≤ t ≤ k. In particular, g(t) equals L S when t = m, and equals 0 when t = k. , i 2 , . . . , i t ) = (1, 2, . . . , t) , without loss of generality. We show the following second main theorem. 
From Theorems 7 and 8, the (n, k, d, m) secure regenerating codes have the secrecy property of a ramp secret sharing scheme, and we have the following remark.
Remark 9:
We mentioned the secrecy capacity and its upper bound for an MBR code at last part in Sect. 2. For an MBR code, we can assume that l = m without loss of generality, and have the inequation (12). For the parameters (α = d, β = 1) of the (n, k, d, m) secure regenerating code, the inequation (12) is represented as
On the other hand, the (n, k, d, m) secure regenerating code satisfies the properties of reconstruction and regeneration in Eqs. (3) and (4), respectively, as mentioned in Sect. 4.2. Moreover, from Theorems 7 and 8, when t = m, the (n, k, d, m) secure regenerating code satisfies the secrecy properties of Eqs. (5) and (6), respectively. Hence, the (n, k, d, m) secure regenerating code achieves the upper bound of the secrecy capacity
Finally, apart from the argument about the security of the ramp type of Eqs. (28) (32) 
Proof of Theorem 7
In this section, we define vectors u (1) , u (2) , u (3) , v (1) , v (2) , w, v, which are dependent to the parameter t introduced in Sect. 5 where 0 ≤ t ≤ k, in order to prove Theorem 7. These vectors are mainly used in the proof of Theorem 15.
Vectors Consisting of Components of the Message Matrix M
We define three kinds of vectors u 
where the above vectors are subvectors of the j-th column vector of the upper-triangular matrix M 1 . Let
where the above vectors are subvectors of the ( j − k)-th column vector of M 2 . Next, from the above defined vectors, the vector u (1) consisting of the k vectors u
where (u (1) j ) t is the transpose of the vector u (1) j , and the vector u (2) consisting of the d − k vectors u
By substituting t for m in Eq. (22) and Eq. (23), the lengths L 1 and L 2 of the vectors u (1) and u (2) are respectively given by
Finally, the vector u (3) consisting of the d − t vectors u
Example 11: (Example 6 continued) Let (k, d, t) = (4, 6, 3). The size B of the message is equal to that of Example 6, i.e., B = 18 because of (k, d) = (4, 6) in both examples. On the other hand, the lengths L 1 and L 2 are given as L 1 = 9 and L 2 = 6, respectively. And then, the length of the vector
The message matrix M is given as follows: 
where the vectors u
j and u (3) j are given as follows:
and
Vectors Consisting of Components of t Shares
In this section, by using the same parameter t used in the previous Sect. 6.1, we define four vectors v (1) , v (2) , w, and v. For any t shares c i 1 , c i 2 , . . . , c i t , we consider making replacement all components of them to new three vectors v (1) , v (2) , and w. For simplifying the notation of the index, let (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i t ) = (1, 2, . . . , t) .
Let A be a set of all components of the t shares c 1 , . . . , c t . The cardinality of the set A is equal to dt. We consider a direct sum decomposition of A such that A is a direct sum of A 1 and A 2 so that for any element in A 2 , the element can be represented by a linear combination of elements in A 1 over F q . To construct such a pair of subsets A 1 and A 2 of A, we define three kinds of vectors v
j and w j below.
For any t shares c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c t , let C(t) be a t × d matrix with components of the t shares as follows:
where the i-th row of the matrix C(t) is the vector of a share c
First, for the j-th column of the matrix C(t), we define the following three kinds of vectors v
Next, from the above defined vectors, let v (1) be a vector consisting of the k vectors v (1) j , 1 ≤ j ≤ k, as follows:
and let v (2) be a vector consisting of the
Let v be a vector consisting of v (1) and v (2) as follows:
The lengths L 1 and L 2 correspond to Eq. (35) and Eq. (36) respectively. Let w be a vector consisting of the t − 1 vectors w j , 1 ≤ j ≤ t − 1, as follows: 
where t = 3, and the vectors v
j , and w j are given as follows:
6 = [c 1, 6 , c 2, 6 , c 3, 6 ] t , and
q . Finally, let A 1 be a set consisting of all components of the vector v, and let A 2 be a set consisting of all components of the vector w. From the definition of v and w, it is true that the set A is the direct sum of A 1 and A 2 . Note that the cardinality of A 1 is equal to L 1 + L 2 , and that of
We show the relation between the sets A 1 and A 2 in the following lemma. Theorem 15: For t random variables C 1 , . . . , C t representing any t shares c 1 , . . . , c t , the conditional entropy H(S |V) of S given V is given by
where the function g(t) is defined by Eq. (29).
Proof : See Appendix C. For each t such that 0 ≤ t ≤ n, the conditional entropy H(S |V) of S given V is as follows:
From Lemma 14, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 17: For t random variables C 1 , . . . , C t representing any t shares c 1 , . . . , c t ,
Proof :
The Finally, a proof of Theorem 7 is derived from the above argument as follows:
Proof 18 (Proof of Theorem 7): From Theorems 15 and 17, Theorem 7 is valid.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a construction of the (n, k, d, m) secure regenerating codes based on the (n, k, d) MBR codes given by Rashmi et al. [3] for all values of the parameters (n, k, d). The (n, k, d, m) secure regenerating codes have the security of a ramp secret sharing scheme and achieve the upper bound of the secrecy capacity. The complexities of encoding, reconstruction and regeneration are the same as that of the underlying MBR code. Next, in the case of l ≥ m, since H(
where equality (e) follows from H(S |C i 1 , . . . , C i l ) = H(S ) by Eq. (9).
From the above argument about both cases and the definition of the secrecy capacity by Eq. (10), we have the following upper bound of the secrecy capacity:
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 13
First, we show the relation between two shares in the following lemma. 
The is nonsingular.
Finally, we show that Eq. (44) is valid by using the fact such that the matrix
is nonsingular. Considering the L S secret symbols and the L R random symbols for the (n, k, d, m) secure regenerating code in the vectors u (1) , u (2) and u (3) , we have the following facts for m ≤ t ≤ k. (See Example 21)
• All the L R random symbols of the random vector R are components of the vectors u (1) and u (2) from the definitions of u (1) and u (2) . Note that the number of all components of u (1) and u (2) is L 1 + L 2 , and L 1 + L 2 ≥ L R when m ≤ t. Let R denote a uniform random variable representing a random vector R.
• The remaining L 1 + L 2 − L R components of u (1) and u (2) are the secret symbols of the secret S . Let S 1 be a vector consisting of the L 1 + L 2 − L R secret symbols, and then, let S 1 denote a random variable representing the vector S 1 .
• The remaining B − L 1 − L 2 secret symbols of the secure S are components of the vector u (3) . Let S 2 be a vector consisting of the B − L 1 − L 2 secret symbols, and then, let S 2 denote a random variable representing the vector S 2 .
By using the random variables S 1 , S 2 , R and V, the equation (A· 12) is represented as
(A· 20)
Furthermore, because of the nonsingular matrix
, the vector [u (1) , u (2) ] is uniquely determined from the vectors [v (1) , v (2) ] and u (3) as follows: = H(S 2 |V) = H(S 2 )
where equality (a) follows from Eq. (A· 22).
